In the 1990s the political landscape had become increasingly fragmented. Aside from the
front-running NDP and the New Front, there were four other contenders in the 1996
elections.
The multi-ethnic DA '91 coalition had unraveled. The Javanese-based Pendawalima
group, a KTPI rival founded in 1977, and the predominantly East Indian Reformed
Progressive Party (HPP), had broken away. That left DA '91 with its founding core group,
the Alternative Forum led by physician Winston Jessurun, the Party for Brotherhood and
Unity in Politics (BEP), a small party of Maroons and Creole intellectuals, and the tiny
Independent Progressive Democratic Alternative (OPDA).
Pendawalima, led by Salim Somohardjo, decided to run its own slate of candidates.
The HPP opted to join the Progressive Development Alliance. The Alliance had been
founded by Frank Playfair and Ernie Brunings, two former Bouterse lieutenants who had
been pushed out of the NDP in early 1993 for protesting the continued influence of the
military within the party. The Alliance also included the left-wing Progressive Surinamese
People's Party (PSV) and another small, left-oriented party.
The sixth contender was the General Liberation and Development Party (ABOP), a
Maroon-based party led by former Jungle Commando leader, Ronnie Brunswijk.
There was a stir in March when the independent electoral office determined that
DA 91, the Alliance, and ABOP had failed to produce membership lists that included at
least 1 percent of registered voters, a requirement for participating in the elections. Amid
threats of civil disturbances, the three parties appealed to Venetiaan. After his office
reviewed the lists, Venetiaan reversed the commission's decision and all three parties were
put on the ballot. The incident raised questions among opposition parties about the
integrity and efficiency of the electoral office.
The Campaign
The showcase of the campaign was the battle between Bouterse and the New Front.
Bouterse had been on the hustings virtually non-stop since leaving the military, holding
forth against the old ethnic parties, the Dutch, human rights activists who were demanding
that he be prosecuted, and foreign investors whom he claimed were a threat to Suriname's
sovereignty. Alternately fiery and statesman-like, the now 50-year-old Bouterse tried to
convey the image of a serious politician. Although he was not a candidate for the National
Assembly, it was generally expected that he would be the NDP's nominee for president.
Bouterse had built the NDP into a impressive machine. He is now one of the
wealthiest men in Suriname, with interests in everything from real estate and timber to
gold, oil, and a variety of import-export operations. He and his former military cohorts in
the NDP preside over a shadow empire of domestic and international businesses that make
the NDP probably the richest political organization in the country. Its resources were used
freely to buy influence throughout Suriname, and to underwrite and equip Dutch-trained
specialists in campaign management, advertising, and demographics.
By 1996 the NDP had been transformed into a truly multiethnic, if not democratic,
party with broad appeal. Young people and the marginalized, especially, flocked to NDP
rallies, gala events featuring local pop stars, giant video screens, and generous giveaways.
They reveled in Bouterse's nationalist message, denunciations of poverty and
unemployment, and his populist promise to reverse Venetiaan's economic reforms and
make everything better. In the interior, Bouterse cemented support by giving chain saws
and other equipment to Amerindians and buying the timber they cut, and by promising
the Maroons that foreign investors would not be allowed to exploit their traditional lands.
In 1995 the Venetiaan government, hunting for money to inject into the economy
prior to the elections, had signed an agreement with the Berjaya Group Berhard of
Malaysia and a letter of intent with the Indonesian MUSA Group that would allow them
to log up to ten million acres in the interior. The contracts awaited approval by the
National Assembly. The deals prompted widespread protests by the Maroon and
Amerindian communities, the political opposition, environmentalists, and even the Inter-American Development Bank. When opinion polls showed that a majority of Surinamers
disapproved, and with the NDP and DA 91 alleging that Surinamese officials had been
bribed by the Asian companies, the government put the agreements on hold until after the
elections. Bouterse vowed to review all agreements with foreign companies if the NDP won
the elections.
For its part, the New Front claimed credit for bringing the army under control and
ending the guerrilla war. It argued that the economy had been turned around without
resorting to the drastic austerity measures demanded by the IMF and that the currency
had stabilized. The New Front warned that if the NDP were elected, it would bring
renewed economic collapse, human rights violations, and international isolation. It painted
Bouterse as a drug-trafficker and portrayed the election as a choice "between democracy
and dictatorship."
New Front rallies were not stirring affairs, pulling in fewer and generally older
people than NDP events. Close to half the population has been born since independence.
As noted by U.S. anthropologist Gary Brana-Shute, a long-time expert on Suriname, the
New Front "graybeards" were out of touch with younger people, relying on 40-year-old
slogans and metaphors and still handing out the traditional salt fish and rum. Brana-Shute,
a member of the OAS election monitoring teams in 1991 and 1996, reported that the
word among many Surinamers was that the New Front leaders were taki-man, just a lot of
talk, while Bouterse was a do-man, a guy who could get something done.
Still, as the campaign continued the New Front narrowed the margin in opinion
polls. Its ratings improved while the NDP's appeared to have leveled off. The Alliance,
which was playing to the same constituency as the NDP, seemed to be picking up support.
The DA 91, still emphasizing anti-corruption and a Commonwealth relationship with the
Netherlands, looked to be weaker than in 1991.
The Institute for Service, Research and Study Guidance (IDOS), which is
Suriname's top polling outfit and is headed by John Krishnadath, had been tracking public
opinion since the last election. In IDOS's findings, the New Front had been chipping away
at the NDP lead from late 1995 until early May when it seemed to draw even, with each
party attracting about a quarter of the voters. The other contenders were drawing only
single digits, and a large group of voters remained undecided.
In the last week before the vote, the final IDOS poll indicated that a majority of the
undecideds had opted for the New Front. That poll showed 37.1 percent for the New
Front and 31.6 percent for the NDP. Local analysts debated what had caused the shift to
the New Front. Some thought that the NDP had peaked too soon, or that voters had been
influenced by recent public statements from Dutch officials indicating that relations with
Suriname would be strained and aid jeopardized if the NDP were to win the elections.
Washington had let it be known that it supported the Dutch view.
Other analysts were not so sure, believing that such statements might still
boomerang on the New Front because of resentment toward the Netherlands. They
considered the race still a toss-up, pointing to the huge turnout for the NDP's final rally
and noting that IDOS did not have the resources to poll in the interior, where the NDP by
most accounts had out-spent and out-organized the New Front.
The campaign closed on an unexpected and eerie note. Two nights before the
election and again the night before, STVS, one of the two state-run television stations,
broadcast an Amnesty International documentary about the 1982 executions that featured
interviews with families of the victims. It was a transparent attempt to influence the
election in favor of the New Front.
Analysts pointed out that the head of STVS was an NPS supporter and that if the
New Front were voted out, his job would probably go with it. Some thought that the
broadcast might work against the New Front if people felt it was unfair to use state
television for obviously political ends. Others thought that some voters might be
influenced in favor of the New Front, but believed that a majority of Surinamers wanted to
leave the incidents of 1982 in the past.
A final point of interest was the internal competition within the New Front for the
presidential nomination. In 1991, the New Front was announced before the elections that
the four parties had agreed upon Venetiaan as its presidential nominee. In 1996 there was
nothing about whether Venetiaan or someone else would assume the presidency if the New
Front won the elections, although Venetiaan had made it clear he wanted a second term.
The word was that the New Front parties would wait to see who won the most seats in the
National Assembly, the NPS or the VHP, before a deal was cut. New Front supporters
were, in effect, voting simultaneously in a presidential primary.
On Thursday, May 23, Surinamers went to the polls in a mostly calm and orderly fashion.
The independent electoral office conducted the vote in a generally professional manner.
Registration lists were computerized and each of the 449 polling sations were manned by
up to ten trained poll workers. Political parties were allowed to place monitors at each
polling station.
To vote, citizens 18 years of age and over had to present their national
identification card (which all Surinamers are required to obtain at the age of 15) and a
numbered voter registration card. The registration card had to match the name and
number on the computerized list at the voter's polling station.
Voters marked two ballots, one for the National Assembly and one for local
councils. Suriname is divided into 10 national districts, each of which is subdivided into
ressorts, or municipalities. There are 62 ressorts, overall.
Each national district is apportioned National Assembly seats based on a number of
factors, with size of population being the most important. For instance, Paramaribo, the
district with the highest population, has 17 seats, while the 3 interior districts Marowijne
(3), Brokopondo (3), and Sipaliwini (4) have 10 seats combined.
In each national district, parties or coalitions could nominate candidates for as
many National Assembly seats as were in play in the district. For example, each party slate
could include up to 17 candidates for the 17 seats held by Paramaribo. Voters in each
district could therefore choose among six party or coalition slates. Each party or coalition
would gain seats in that district based on the proportion of the vote it received.
Voters also had a "preferential balloting" option. The contenders prepared their lists
with favored candidates at the top. But the voter could indicate a preference for any one of
the candidates on a party list by putting his or her mark next to that person's name. If that
party won enough votes proportionally to gain, say, four of the seats available in a district,
those seats would go to the four highest vote-getters on its list, no matter where they
appeared on the list.
The system is essentially the same at the local level. Each ressort is apportioned seats
based primarily on population. For example, Paramaribo is divided into 12 local districts,
each with between 13 and 17 seats, while Brokopondo is divided into 6 local districts, each
with between 7 and 11 seats. There are 62 local districts in all, with a combined total of
712 seats.
The local ballot is similar to the National Assembly ballot. Each party or coalition
can nominate a list of candidates for the number of seats available in the ressort, and each
gains seats on the local council based on the proportion of the vote it wins. Preferential
balloting also applies at the local level.
The voting at the local level also indirectly determines the composition of national
district councils. The number of seats in each national district council is determined
primarily by size of population. For example, the Paramaribo district council has 21 seats,
while Brokopondo's district council has 7 seats. A party or coalition gains seats on a
national district council based on its proportion of the combined vote from all the ressorts
in the particular district. There are a total of 106 district council seats.
It should be noted that not all of the six competing parties and coalitions in 1996
were able to run candidates for every available national or local seat. In fact, only the
NDP, the New Front, and DA 91 had the resources and organization to run National
Assembly candidate slates in all 10 districts. ABOP did not run candidates in a number of
the coastal districts. In the three districts in the interior, Pendawalima was not able to run
any candidates, and the Alliance only in Brokopondo.
Smaller parties were at an even greater disadvantage when it came to filling
candidate lists at the local level. The large parties, the NDP and the New Front, could pick
up greater numbers of local seats simply by default. This is important because if no party
or coalition gains the two-thirds of the seats National Assembly 34 out of 51 necessary
to name the nation's president, the decision then goes to the People's Assembly, which is
composed of the 51 National Assembly members, the 106 district council members, and
the 712 local council members. To become president, a candidate needs the votes of only a
simple majority in the People's Assembly.
In 1991, the New Front won 55 percent of the popular vote. But in the People's
Assembly Venetiaan garnered nearly 80 percent of the votes. That was in large part
because it had the resources and organization to run full candidate slates in practically all
of the 62 local elections.
Although the general trend of the May 23, 1996 vote was known the day after the
election, the electoral office did not issue final results until June 12. That was because the
office had to review complaints about irregularities, most of which came from the NDP,
which alleged that there were a number of missing ballot boxes and other irregularities
sufficient to annul the vote and hold new elections. The electoral office, however,
determined that irregularities had been minor and did not affect the outcome. The OAS
observer mission drew the same conclusion and noted that its secret, parallel count had
dovetailed almost exactly with the official count.
Voter turnout was 66.8 percent, only slightly lower than the 67 percent turnout in
1991. Turnout in 1987 was 88 percent. The New Front won a plurality of the valid votes,
taking 41.8 percent of the vote, down from 55 percent in 1991. The NDP won 26.2
percent, up from 22 percent in 1991. DA 91 took 13 percent, down from 16.5 percent.
Pendawalima, which had been part of DA '91 in the last election, won 9.2 percent. The
Alliance, a breakaway from the NDP in 1993, won 8.4 percent. ABOP took 1.4 percent.
In the National Assembly the New Front won 24 seats, down from 30 in 1991. The
NDP won 16 seats, up from 12 in 1991 (actually up from 10, because it had lost 2 seats in
1993 when the Alliance broke away). DA 91 won four seats, down from nine in 1991.
Pendawalima won four seats, and the Alliance three. ABOP was shut out.
Within the New Front, the NPS won 9 National Assembly seats, down from 12 in
1991. The VHP also won nine, the same as in 1991. The KTPI won five, down from seven
in 1991. The SPA took one seat, down from two in 1991.
In the vote for local assemblies in the nation's 62 ressorts, the New Front won 487
seats overall, while the NDP took 166. Pendawalima won 29, the Alliance took 11, DA 91
won 9, and ABOP took 6. In the 10 district assemblies the New Front took a total of 69
seats, NDP 28, Pendawalima 5, the Alliance 2, and DA 91 and ABOP 1 each.
As in 1991, no party or coalition achieved the two-thirds seats in the National
Assembly necessary to name the nation's president. In the aftermath of the vote,
incumbent president Venetiaan stated, "We have won the elections, but we came out with
our clothes in tatters." In the end, that turned out to be an overly optimistic assessment.
The week after the vote, a Christian-based civic group, the Sibibusi Movement for
Restoration and Unity, called for a national unity government, one in which all parties
would agree on the appointment of non-political, technocratic types who would establish
clean and honest rule during a two-year interim period. Sibibusi, in Maroon dialect, literally
means the broom that sweeps the forest, and refers to a powerful wind that blows away
dead and rotting wood.
Bouterse, realizing that the OAS had given its stamp of approval to the electoral
process, opportunistically jumped on the idea of a national unity government and offered
to form a ruling coalition with the New Front. Venetiaan rejected the offer and stated that
the New Front would only negotiate with DA 91 and Pendawalima. That prompted DA
91 and Pendawalima to form an alliance, the so-called Middle Bloc, to enhance their
leverage in negotiations with the New Front.
At the same time, there were rumbles within the New Front itself. The VHP had
held its 9 seats in the National Assembly, while the NPS had dropped from 12 to 9.
Reportedly, the VHP wanted not only for Lachmon, now nearly 80-years-old, to remain as
assembly speaker, it was angling for the presidency, too.
When the NPS apparently balked, Lachmon sent emissaries to the NDP and the
KTPI, reportedly to discuss the possibility of a VHP-NDP-KTPI alliance. Back-channel
relations between the VHP and the NDP and rumors about a possible pact between them
date back to the mid-1980s. For its part, the KTPI might have had an interest in such an
arrangement because it was chafing at the idea of the New Front allying with
Pendawalima, the KTPI's arch rival in the Javanese community.
A number of analysts believed that Lachmon's play was only an attempt to put
pressure on Venetiaan and the NPS, not a serious effort to link up with Bouterse. The
Dutch, however, reportedly were alarmed enough to inform Lachmon that they would not
be pleased at all if the VHP made a deal with the NDP.
As the backroom bargaining, rumors, and speculation continued in June, analysts
examined the results more closely. Although the NDP had not done as well as many
expected, it had maintained its steady growth over the last decade and now was the
strongest party in the country. Its 16 seats were 7 more than both the NPS and the VHP.
The NDP could have done even better given that the Alliance won three seats courting the
same constituency, the poor and the young. Some analysts theorized that the NDP had
peaked too soon, or that on election day the party had failed to fully mobilize its backers,
some of whom may have stayed away, convinced the NDP would win anyway given
Bouterse's triumphalism during the campaign.
The NDP made its greatest gains in the interior. In the three interior
districts Sipaliwini, Brokopondo, and Marowijne the NDP climbed from two to six seats
in the National Assembly, while the New Front dropped from five to four seats. DA 91
lost all three of the seats it had won in the interior in 1991.
The NDP's surge in the interior can be attributed to its strong opposition to the
foreign logging agreements endorsed by the New Front, Bouterse's provision of equipment
and business to local loggers, and to the NDP's heavy spending in a region the government
had neglected despite its pledge to provide development aid.
It is noteworthy that the Maroon-based ABOP, led by Ronnie Brunswijk, failed to
win a seat, even in the interior. ABOP had few resources and was late in campaigning, and
the NDP was expected to garner much of the Amerindian vote because the military had
subsidized them in the late 1980s. Still, Maroons outnumber Amerindians by nearly four-to-one and Brunswijk was once a guerrilla hero among the Maroons.
But in the end it seems that close to a majority of Maroons voted for the NDP,
even though their communities experienced severe repression under Bouterse's military in
the late 1980s. The fact that so many went with Bouterse in 1996 is testimony to the dire
needs of people in the interior today, and their perception that only Bouterse, the do-man,
can get anything done for them, no matter what he did in the past or the real possibility
that his intentions now may be no less malign.
Within the New Front there were probably a number of reasons for the decline of
the NPS. Some black supporters may have been inclined to go with the NDP because of
disillusion with Venetiaan's economic austerity program, or out of fear that a New Front
victory would this time result in a president from the East Indian community. The decline
of the KTPI was due at least in part to the reemergence of Pendawalima as a clear
alternative for the Javanese community following its split from DA 91.
As in 1991, the New Front performed far better in the local elections than at the
national level, owing in part to its ability to put up complete candidate lists in each of the
62 ressorts. Given the resources at the NDP's disposal, it had been expected to do better at
the local level, especially given the role the local results can play in a tight race. Also, some
analysts suggested that some voters split their vote, going for local New Front incumbents
and voting against the New Front at the national level. Without exit polls, though, it will
be difficult to know how many voters did split their votes and the manner in which they
did it.
The Front Unravels, Bouterse Gets His Way
In June many observers assumed that the wheeling and dealing would eventually result in a
ruling coalition formed by the New Front, DA 91, and Pendawalima. That certainly was
what the Dutch were pressing for. In that scenario, whomever was chosen as the
presidential candidate would be elected by the People's Assembly, where the New Front on
its own would have a majority of the seats. But as local analyst Stuart Tjon-A-Joe said at
the time, echoing John Krishnadath and others, "This country has become so fragmented,
and so unstable, anything can happen."
What did happen was the unraveling of the New Front and the breakdown of the
consociational model. The New Front, DA 91, and Pendawalima did succeed in reelecting
Lachmon as speaker of the National Assembly. But the coalition and the New Front itself
finally came undone amid bitter negotiations over whether Venetiaan should be replaced
as president and the distribution of ministries and other government spoils. Deals were
made and unmade within days, followed by accusations of betrayal. Krishnadath described
the situation as "a complete mess." An IDOS poll in July showed that 70 percent of the
population believed that no politicians were reliable.
The first formal split occurred in early August when five anti-Venetiaan VHP
parliamentarians broke away from the New Front to support Jules Wijdenbosch, the
NDP's candidate for the presidency. Wijdenbosch, an NDP founder, has been a close
associate of Bouterse since the early 1980s. The split put pressure on Lachmon and the
NPS to shore up the New Front's ties to the Middle Bloc. But DA 91 and particularly
Pendawalima used the opportunity to demand more ministries from Lachmon and
Venetiaan. In late August, when it looked like Pendawalima might get what it was asking,
the KTPI, with five seats in the National Assembly, bolted from the New Front and joined
the VHP dissidents in backing Wijdenbosch.
The New Front was finished. It now had only 14 seats of its own in the parliament,
and the New Front-DA 91-Pendawalima coalition was down to 22 seats. The NDP-led
coalition, which now included the VHP dissidents, the KTPI, and the Alliance, had 29
seats. Bouterse is known for defying critics by grabbing a microphone at rallies, restaurants,
and nightclubs and singing "My Way." Krishnadath said at the end of August, "Now he
must be singing, It's A Wonderful Feeling'."
Because neither coalition had enough seats to name a president, the outcome would
be determined by the People's Assembly, which took place on September 5. Wijdenbosch
won the presidency by taking 438 votes to 407 for Venetiaan. Wijdenbosch was backed by
all NDP, KTPI, and Alliance representatives. Nearly half the VHP representatives followed
the VHP dissidents in backing him. Apparently even some of Pendawalima's local
representatives defected, too.
Concluding Assessments
The consociational, ethnic-coalition model of government in Suriname has finally run
aground. When the first Front government won the 1987 elections, there were hopes that
the ethnic-coalition model could be made to work as it had in the 1950s and 1960s. But it
succumbed to the mentality among the old political elites of placing group before national
interests, and by the undemocratic nature of the ethnic-based parties over which they
preside. Civilian rule after 1987 remained based mostly on deals, patronage, and graft, and
that in large part was why the electoral fortunes of successive Front governments steadily
declined. As Gary Brana-Shute put it at the time of the 1996 vote, "The graybeards are
out of touch. They have learned nothing."
The electorate penalized the New Front in 1996 by not giving it enough votes to
stay in power on its own, and in the ensuing effort to widen the coalition, the New Front
destroyed itself. That opened the way for the return to power of Bouterse and the NDP.
Bouterse is not president, but his man Jules Wijdenbosch is.
Wijdenbosch goes back with Bouterse to the early 1980s when he was a founder of
the radical left February 25th Movement, the first political arm of the military and the
precursor of the NDP. Wijdenbosch was a principal figure in successive front governments
for the military in the mid-1980s and in the interim government between the 1990
telephone coup and the 1991 elections. He is a skilled operator and a force in his own
right, but at the time of his inauguration in September there were no signs that he was
anything but loyal to Bouterse.
Wijdenbosch promised that his government would begin with a 100-day program to
restructure government and economic policy. But his administration inherits great social
and economic problems and must address the heightened expectations of the poor, the
young, and the jungle dwellers that supported the NDP in the May vote.
Suriname's political landscape is evermore fragmented, suffering not only ethnic
divisions, but increasingly sharper class and generational splits, as well. The NDP now may
be the most popular party in Suriname, but it is still a minority party leading a coalition of
last-minute opportunists which in the end may be no more stable than was the New Front.
If the coalition starts to crack or its policies lead to unrest, all eyes will be on Bouterse.
And that raises the overall question of what Bouterse, the made-over dictator and
self-styled do-man, will do now. Will he be content to be the most powerful political and
economic figure in the country from behind the scenes, or will the mercurial former
military ruler come to the fore in some new, unforeseen way? The Hague and Washington
will be watching closely, particularly as it pertains to drug-trafficking.
Other questions include whether the new government can reap trade benefits from
Suriname's newly realized membership in CARICOM and the ACS, and how it will deal
with the jarring news in June that Alcoa was cutting annual worldwide production of
smelter grade alumina, including at its Suralco facility. Finally, the continuation of Dutch
aid remained in question. Although the Hague appeared willing at least to take a wait-and-see attitude regarding the new government, it was clearly not happy about the outcome of
the elections.
A very uncertain picture is brightened somewhat by the emergence of stronger civic
institutions since the end of military rule. The Christian-based Sibibusi Movement is just
one example. And while its proposal for a national unity government after the 1996 vote
was easily manipulated by Bouterse, its focus on the need for honest government is right
on target. Movements such as Sibibusi may provide an alternative to young Surinamers
now attracted to Bouterse's NDP.
IDOS is planning media and school programs to educate about political
modernization, democratizing political parties, and environmental preservation, and its
director is looking to network with similarly minded groups abroad, particularly in the
United States. There are also a number of professional human rights organizations who
continue to prepare briefs in hopes of holding the military accountable for human rights
violations during its reign.
Finally, women are making inroads in Suriname's traditionally male-dominated
society. The population is about 53 percent female and women are increasingly taking an
active role in civic organizations. The percentage of female candidates for the National
Assembly rose from 5 percent (18 women) in 1991 to to 25 percent in 1996 (61 women).
In 1994 a multi-party women's forum was formed by the handful of women elected to the
National Assembly. In 1996 the forum was active in training women candidates from all
the contending parties. Given the performance of male leadership in the two decades since
independence, and the need for new ideas to address mounting social problems, the
emergence of women in the civic and political arenas is a sign of hope.
About the Author
Douglas W. Payne has covered Latin America and the Caribbean for more than a decade.
He has reported on elections throughout the region and testified on regional issues before
the U.S. Congress. He is the author of the CSIS Western Hemisphere Election Study
Series reports on the 1995 Trinidad and Tobago elections, the 1994 Antigua and Barbuda
elections, and the 1994 St. Vincent and the Grenadines elections, as well as Democracy in
the Caribbean: A Cause for Concern (CSIS 1995). He also has written for Harper's Magazine,
The New Republic, The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal and The
International Herald Tribune.